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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
To explain a perceived demotion to judges, other 
attorneys, and county officials, Appellee, an Assistant Public 
Defender, circulated a rumor he had heard and alleged he was 
being punished for taking too many cases to trial.  After the 
Public Defender fired Appellee for those statements, Appellee 
filed suit, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights, 
and the District Court denied the Public Defender’s motion 
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.  
Because we conclude the First Amendment does not protect 
the speech at issue here—statements made while performing 
official job responsibilities, speculative comments about the 
reason for a perceived demotion, and recklessly false rumors 
circulated to government officials—we will reverse and 
remand. 
I. Background 
Appellee Joseph De Ritis became an Assistant Public 
Defender for Delaware County in December 2005.  
Consistent with the typical progression for attorneys in the 
Office of the Public Defender, De Ritis was first assigned to 
the Office’s preliminary hearing unit, was elevated to the 
juvenile court unit in May 2007, and was ultimately assigned 
to a “trial team,” or a group of three attorneys assigned to 
handle trials in a particular judge’s courtroom, in November 
2007. 
But things changed in June 2012, when the Public 
Defender, Douglas C. Roger, Jr., informed De Ritis that 
staffing changes were necessary in the wake of another 
Assistant Public Defender’s motorcycle accident and that 
De Ritis would be transferred back to the juvenile court unit.  
Case: 16-1433     Document: 003112662538     Page: 3      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
 4 
 
Roger justified the transfer by noting that De Ritis was “an 
expert at juvenile law.”  App. 128A.  Although De Ritis was 
not actually interested in juvenile law, he agreed to the 
transfer. 
De Ritis suspected, however, that Roger had other reasons 
for transferring him, so he asked others whether they knew 
the true reasons for the transfer.  He asserts his inquiries 
yielded fruit on two occasions.  First, De Ritis contends that, 
one or two weeks after his transfer, First Assistant Public 
Defender Francis Zarilli told De Ritis that Roger had 
transferred him because De Ritis’s clients were not pleading 
guilty fast enough, which was contrary to the wishes of 
Delaware County’s President Judge, Chad Kenney.  Second, 
De Ritis asserts that, later that month, Jake Dolan, a former 
Assistant Public Defender, gave him the same explanation, 
i.e., that Roger removed De Ritis from a trial team because he 
was not “moving [his] cases,” App. 129A, 200A, though 
De Ritis concedes that his conversation with Dolan occurred 
during a “Taco Tuesday” session of after-work “gossip” and 
that Dolan professed his account was “fourth-person 
hearsay,” App. 129A.  De Ritis assumed Zarilli and Dolan’s 
information was accurate, however, and he immediately 
began sharing it as the reason for his transfer—and continued 
to do so over the course of the next eleven months. 
De Ritis’s rumors proceeded in three phases.  First, in the 
wake of his transfer to the preliminary hearing unit, he 
informed judges, private attorneys, and his colleagues at the 
Office of the Public Defender that he was “being punished” 
for “taking too many cases to trial.”  App. 134A, 174A.  
Although De Ritis did not speak “on the record” about why 
he was transferred, he acknowledges he shared the rumor 
while he was representing clients in court, “during the usual 
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idle chatter while waiting for court to begin or end.”  
App. 175A.  Despite circulating the alleged reason for his 
transfer widely, De Ritis did not discuss the issue with Roger. 
Second, four months later, De Ritis’s statements about his 
allegedly excessive trial practice intensified after Roger 
granted De Ritis’s voluntary request to be transferred to the 
preliminary hearing unit.  De Ritis continued sharing the 
rumor about being punished with attorneys and judges, even 
to the point of telling one judge, Judge Stephanie Klein, that 
he had been transferred because he “had refused . . . to obey a 
‘policy,’ established by [Roger], that the Public Defenders’ 
office should try to plead guilty as many criminal defendants 
as possible in order to more easily dispose of the cases 
assigned to us and pending before the court.”  App. 38A.  
De Ritis still did not discuss the issue with Roger himself. 
Third, a few months later, De Ritis thought things would 
change when openings became available on the trial team for 
a newly elected judge.  They did not.  Although De Ritis 
asked Roger to assign De Ritis to the trial team, Roger 
declined.  Unhappy with that result, De Ritis turned his 
efforts toward “seek[ing] an audience” with the County 
Council.  App. 175A. 
De Ritis initially pursued that goal by approaching the 
County Solicitor, Michael Maddren, and telling him the same 
rumor—namely, that Roger had transferred De Ritis off of a 
trial team because De Ritis was not “moving” cases and 
“wanted to take too many cases to trial,” which was at odds 
with President Judge Kenney’s preferences.  App. 52A, 
136A.  De Ritis “suggested that this was violating the rights 
of his clients,” particularly in view of “the constitutional 
implications of public defenders being demoted because they 
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advise defendants to seek trials.”  App. 52A, 176A.  Although 
Maddren agreed to investigate, Maddren ultimately declined 
to pursue the matter further after contacting Roger and 
learning that De Ritis “was not performing well” as an 
Assistant Public Defender.  App. 53A. 
De Ritis then met with the chairman of the County 
Council, Thomas McGarrigle.  De Ritis had “the same 
conversation” with McGarrigle that he had had with Maddren 
and stated that he would like to address the County Council 
about his situation.  App. 137A, 176A.  As Maddren had 
done, McGarrigle agreed to investigate, although it does not 
appear he contacted De Ritis again about the matter. 
This rumormongering finally came to an end in May 
2013, when Roger heard about De Ritis’s allegations by 
means of Judge Klein’s comments to another Assistant Public 
Defender.  Astonished, Roger asked De Ritis whether the 
report from Judge Klein was true, and De Ritis admitted that, 
after appearing “in . . . court to handle a preliminary hearing,” 
App. 38A, he had told Judge Klein that he was being 
punished for taking too many cases to trial.  What’s more, 
De Ritis also told Roger that he had made similar comments 
to other attorneys, to other judges, to Maddren, and to 
McGarrigle.  Because of De Ritis’s statements to all of these 
individuals, Roger fired De Ritis. 
De Ritis brought suit against Roger soon after, seeking 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claiming that Roger’s 
decision to fire De Ritis violated De Ritis’s First Amendment 
rights.1  After discovery, and in view of his status as a 
                                              
1 In addition to Roger, De Ritis also named as defendants 
Judge Kenney; Maddren; the Delaware County Council and 
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government official, Roger moved for summary judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds, but the District Court denied the 
motion.  See De Ritis v. Roger, 165 F. Supp. 3d 231, 239-46 
(E.D. Pa. 2016).  This appeal timely followed. 
                                                                                                     
all of its members, including McGarrigle; and Delaware 
County itself as defendants.  He brought the same First 
Amendment claim against those defendants and, in addition, 
brought claims against all defendants under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 1988; the 
Pennsylvania common law of civil conspiracy, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge; and 
the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 1423-1428.  Except for De Ritis’s First Amendment and 
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claims against Roger, the 
District Court dismissed or entered judgment in the 
defendants’ favor on the other claims.  See De Ritis v. Roger, 
165 F. Supp. 3d 231, 246-50 (E.D. Pa. 2016); De Ritis v. 
McGarrigle, No. 13-6212, 2014 WL 2892419, at *2-9 (E.D. 
Pa. June 25, 2014).  In this interlocutory qualified immunity 
appeal, Roger does not challenge the District Court’s denial 
of summary judgment on the Pennsylvania Whistleblower 
Law claim, thus the First Amendment claim against Roger is 
the only claim before us. 
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II. Jurisdiction2 and Standard of Review 
Where, as here, a district court has denied summary 
judgment and trial is still to come, we typically lack appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which allows us to 
review only “final” district court decisions.  See Johnson v. 
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).  But “collateral orders,” or 
orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, 
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to 
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to 
require that appellate consideration be deferred,” equate to 
“final” decisions and qualify for immediate appeal.  Id. at 
310-11.  Such is the order before us today. 
“When the defense of qualified immunity is raised and 
denied, a defendant is generally entitled to an immediate 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine so long as the denial 
turns on an issue of law.”  Oliver v. Roquet, No. 14-4824, 
2017 WL 2260961, at *3 (3d Cir. May 24, 2017).  We thus 
have jurisdiction to review “whether the set of facts identified 
by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a 
clearly established constitutional right” and therefore to 
ground a denial of qualified immunity, Dougherty v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014), and we 
decide this legal issue “with reference only to undisputed 
facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of the case,” 
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313.  That is, we “take, as given, the 
facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary 
judgment,” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, and we view them in 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over De Ritis’s First 
Amendment claim against Roger pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. 
Case: 16-1433     Document: 003112662538     Page: 8      Date Filed: 06/29/2017
 9 
 
the light most favorable to De Ritis, the non-movant here, 
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986. 
Within these parameters, our review is plenary, and we 
will overturn the District Court’s denial of summary 
judgment “only when the record ‘shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a)). 
III. Discussion 
In reviewing a district court’s denial of qualified 
immunity, we must reverse if the defending government 
official did not violate a statutory or constitutional right or, 
even if he did, if that right was not “clearly established” at the 
time of the challenged conduct.  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 
2369, 2381 (2014).  Here, addressing both prongs of qualified 
immunity, the District Court concluded that Roger had 
violated De Ritis’s right to free speech and that the right, as 
defined by the District Court, was clearly established.  See 
De Ritis, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 239-46.  Although the District 
Court wrote a thoughtful and detailed opinion that wrestled 
with our case law and with the sensitive issues presented by 
this case, we ultimately disagree with its conclusion and hold 
that Roger did not violate De Ritis’s First Amendment rights 
and that Roger therefore was entitled to qualified immunity.3 
                                              
3 While we have discretion to address the two prongs of 
qualified immunity in either order, we resolve this case at the 
first prong, both to “promote[] the development of 
constitutional precedent” and for efficiency’s sake, as “a 
discussion of why the relevant facts do not violate clearly 
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The First Amendment of the Constitution broadly protects 
citizens’ rights to “freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I, 
and the law has long held that “citizens do not surrender their 
First Amendment rights by accepting public employment,” 
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374.  However, unlike members of the 
general public who may be liable for defamation when they 
make statements with “actual malice,” N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), public employees’ 
First Amendment rights are limited by the Government’s 
countervailing interest in efficient provision of public 
services, see Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377, so in this context the 
First Amendment inquiry obliges us to apply a different test.  
Because De Ritis was a public employee, De Ritis’s speech is 
protected by the First Amendment only (1) if he spoke “as a 
citizen (and not as an employee),” (2) if his speech involved 
“a matter of public concern,” and (3) if his employer lacked 
an “adequate justification” for treating him differently from 
the general public, based on a balancing of his and his 
employer’s interests under Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U.S. 563 (1968).  See Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. 
Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 466 (3d Cir. 2015). 
After careful consideration, and in view of our plenary 
review of this question of law,4 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
established law” would in this case “make it apparent that in 
fact the relevant facts do not make out a constitutional 
violation at all.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 
(2009).   
4 Granted, whether speech is protected turns on a “mixed 
question of fact and law” when a dispute exists over 
“[w]hether a particular incident of speech is made within a 
particular plaintiff’s job duties.”  Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 
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179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009); see De Ritis, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 244, 
we conclude that none of the statements for which De Ritis 
was fired qualifies as protected speech.5  We divide those 
statements into three categories for purposes of analysis—
(1) statements to judges and attorneys while in court, 
(2) statements to attorneys outside of the courthouse, and 
(3) statements to County Solicitor Maddren and County 
Council Chairman McGarrigle6—and consider the criteria for 
protected speech as applied to each category below. 
                                                                                                     
776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015).  But the scope and content 
of De Ritis’s job responsibilities is undisputed here, so 
whether De Ritis’s statements qualify as protected speech is a 
purely legal question. 
5 Even if we held that De Ritis’s speech was protected, 
De Ritis could ultimately prevail on his claim of First 
Amendment retaliation only if the District Court also held 
that his speech was “a substantial or motivating factor” in the 
decision to fire him and that, in the absence of that speech, 
Roger would not have fired him.  Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466.  
Because the undisputed facts show De Ritis cannot establish 
protected speech, we need not reach these latter two elements 
of a First Amendment retaliation claim. 
6 We address De Ritis’s statements to each of three 
categories of recipients because, even though the District 
Court’s First Amendment analysis addressed only De Ritis’s 
“statements to . . . Maddren and . . . McGarrigle,” De Ritis, 
165 F. Supp. 3d at 240, the District Court’s order denied 
Roger qualified immunity with respect to all of De Ritis’s 
statements, and an appeal is taken with respect to “the 
definitive order or judgment which follows the opinion,” not 
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1. Citizen Speech 
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
However, the line between citizen speech and employee 
speech varies with each case’s circumstances, for we may not 
draw the line using such simple tests as whether the employee 
spoke “within the office,” id. at 420-21, whether his 
statements were made pursuant to duties described in his 
“[f]ormal job description[],” id. at 424-25, or whether “speech 
concerns information related to or learned through public 
employment,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.  We instead make a 
“practical” inquiry, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424, and assess 
“whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the 
scope of an employee’s duties,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.  If 
so, then it is employee speech and receives no First 
Amendment protection. 
Such is the case for De Ritis’s in-court statements to 
attorneys and judges.  It is undisputed that De Ritis’s ordinary 
job duties included in-court obligations “to build rapport with 
the Court” and other attorneys.  App. 46A.  And for good 
reason, because attorneys, both private and public, are 
“officers of the Court,” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.3 
cmt. [2] (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015), and their statements in court, 
even if “idle chatter” and not “on the record,” App. 175A, are 
then “[o]fficial communications” with “official 
                                                                                                     
the opinion itself, In re Chelsea Hotel Corp., 241 F.2d 846, 
848 (3d Cir. 1957); see Fed. R. App. P. 4. 
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consequences” that create “a need for substantive consistency 
and clarity,” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.  After all, even 
offhand in-court statements, particularly for government 
attorneys but also for private counsel, may affect the judicial 
process, see Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.5; cf. Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965), and often the attorney’s 
statements are a proxy for the positions of both his clients and 
his employer, see Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rr. 1.2, 5.1, 
5.2(b) & cmt. [2].7  Accordingly, a supervising attorney like 
Roger “need[s] a significant degree of control” over his 
subordinate attorneys’ in-court statements in order to prevent 
subordinates from “express[ing] views that contravene 
governmental policies or impair the proper performance of 
governmental functions.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.  
Here, De Ritis’s in-court statements to attorneys and judges 
were all made while waiting for a proceeding “on the record” 
to begin or end, App. 175A, and thus were part and parcel of 
his ordinary job duties—not citizen speech, see Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 422-24. 
Our conclusion regarding De Ritis’s in-court statements 
finds support in our case law on citizen speech.  Our cases 
consistently hold that, though speech may be protected even 
if it “concerns information related to or learned through 
public employment,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377; see, e.g., 
Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 172-80 (3d Cir. 
2015), an employee does not speak as a citizen if the mode 
and manner of his speech were possible only as an ordinary 
corollary to his position as a government employee, see Lane, 
                                              
7 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which apply to De Ritis, say as much.  See Pa. R. Prof’l 
Conduct rr. 1.2, 3.3 cmt. [2], 3.5, 5.1, 5.2(b) & cmt. [2]. 
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134 S. Ct. at 2379; Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186.  As we discussed 
in Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, for 
example, police officers do not speak as citizens when they 
object to police department policies by means of “police 
department counseling forms,” for “[c]itizens do not complete 
internal police counseling forms.”  842 F.3d 231, 243-44 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  Here, similarly, because De Ritis had the 
opportunity to speak in court to attorneys and judges only as 
an ordinary corollary to his position as an Assistant Public 
Defender, see App. 174A-75A, his speech in that role was not 
citizen speech. 
To be sure, citizens may offer truthful in-court testimony 
as witnesses, see Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 
(3d Cir. 2008), may bring class action lawsuits based on 
information learned through their jobs, see Flora, 776 F.3d at 
176-80, and may even report alleged workplace misconduct 
to government officials, as De Ritis did in his meetings with 
Maddren and McGarrigle.  Yet, just as citizens do not 
“complete internal police counseling forms,” which are 
reserved for police officers, Fraternal Order of Police, 842 
F.3d at 244, they also do not make “idle chatter [with 
attorneys and judges] while waiting for court to begin or end” 
as a public defender representing a client may do, App. 175A.  
Such chatter is not citizen speech and is not protected by the 
First Amendment.8 
                                              
8 Our discussion of citizen speech applies equally to 
De Ritis’s communications with his clients as an Assistant 
Public Defender and to the application for a writ of habeas 
corpus that he filed on behalf of a client.  Although De Ritis 
contends that these communications are protected by the First 
Amendment, they are clearly instances in which De Ritis 
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De Ritis did, of course, discuss the rumor about his 
transfers with attorneys while not in court and with Maddren 
and McGarrigle.  And those statements are arguably citizen 
speech because they were not “part of the work [De Ritis] 
was paid to perform on an ordinary basis.”  Flora, 776 F.3d at 
180.  With those statements in mind, we turn to the second 
required attribute of protected speech: the requirement that 
the speech “involve a matter of public concern.”  Munroe, 
805 F.3d at 466. 
2. Speech on a Matter of Public Concern 
To involve a matter of public concern, speech must relate 
to “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to 
the public,” whether it is a “matter of political, social or other 
concern to the community” or “a subject of legitimate news 
interest.”  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.  By contrast, speech does 
not involve a matter of public concern when it relates solely 
to “mundane employment grievances.”  Munroe, 805 F.3d at 
467. 
We determine the public or nonpublic nature of an 
employee’s speech by reference to the speech’s “content, 
form, and context,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380, which 
encompasses “the employee’s motivation as well as whether 
                                                                                                     
spoke in his capacity as an Assistant Public Defender and not 
in his capacity as a citizen, as it is undisputed that “talk[ing] 
to the client to . . . get . . . [his or her] input into working out 
the case” and “get[ting] done what was needed to favorably 
resolve the client’s case[],” App. 45A, were activities 
“ordinarily within the scope of [De Ritis’s] duties,” Lane, 134 
S. Ct. at 2379. 
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it is important to our system of self-government that the 
expression take place,” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467.  But we do 
not consider whether a statement is “inappropriate” or 
“controversial,” because “humor, satire, and even ‘personal 
invective’” can make a point about a matter of public 
concern.  Id. at 470.  The “tone of the communications” is 
irrelevant.  Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. 
of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Because we are not to “make a superficial characterization 
of the speech or activity taken as a whole,” we conduct “a 
particularized examination of each activity for which the 
protection of the First Amendment is claimed” to determine 
whether it involves a matter of public concern, id. at 451; see, 
e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983); 
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469-70; Johnson, 776 F.2d at 450-54, 
while taking care not to “‘cherry pick’ something that may 
impact the public while ignoring [its] manner and context,” 
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467.  That is to say, we will hold that a 
discrete unit of speech addresses a matter of public concern if 
it discusses “fundamental problems” reaching beyond the 
employee’s “day-to-day minutiae,” Watters v. City of Phila., 
55 F.3d 886, 894 (3d Cir. 1995), such as a concern that all 
assistant district attorneys in an office are required to work on 
political campaigns, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49, a 
concern about academic integrity in today’s youth generally, 
see Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469-70, or a concern about academic 
standards applicable to a university as a whole, see Johnson, 
776 F.2d at 451-54.  But if a discrete unit of speech addresses 
only the employee’s own problems, and even if those 
problems “brush . . . against a matter of public concern” by 
virtue of that employee’s public employment, then that 
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speech is merely a “personal grievance.”  Miller v. Clinton 
Cty., 544 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2008).9 
Applying these principles here, we hold that De Ritis’s 
out-of-court statements to other attorneys did not involve a 
matter of public concern, while his statements to Maddren 
and McGarrigle did.  The undisputed evidence in the record 
establishes that De Ritis’s out-of-court statements to other 
attorneys addressed only De Ritis’s own employment 
situation: “I’m being punished.”  “Apparently, I’m taking too 
many cases to trial.”  “Judge Kenney thinks I’m telling too 
many defendants they can have trials.”  App. 134A, 174A-
175A (emphases added).  In these statements, De Ritis never 
discussed any “fundamental problems” reaching beyond his 
own “day-to-day minutiae,” Watters, 55 F.3d at 894, such as, 
for example, his later contention that his clients’ rights were 
being violated.  De Ritis’s out-of-court statements to 
attorneys, thus, at most “brush[ed] . . . against” matters of 
public concern, Miller, 544 F.3d at 551, and they do not merit 
First Amendment protection. 
De Ritis’s conversations with Maddren and with 
McGarrigle are a different matter.  In both of those 
discussions, De Ritis went further and expressed concern for 
                                              
9 De Ritis asks us to overrule Miller on the ground that it 
is at odds with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964).  We decline to do so, as New York Times did not arise 
in the public employment context, where “the First 
Amendment allows a public employer to regulate its 
employees’ speech in ways it could never regulate the general 
public’s.”  Swineford v. Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1270 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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individuals other than himself: he suggested that the reason he 
believed he was transferred, i.e., his penchant for taking too 
many cases to trial, violated “the rights of his clients” to the 
point of having “constitutional implications.”  App. 52A, 
176A.  That is, he did not confine his complaints to his own 
employment situation, cf. Miller, 544 F.3d at 550-51, but 
instead spoke about a “matter of political, social or other 
concern to the community” in discussing the rights of 
criminal defendants generally, Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380, and 
in seeking a “public mien” for his complaints, Swineford v. 
Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994). 
At the same time, we recognize that, because “six months 
or eight months” elapsed before De Ritis attempted to 
investigate the truth of the rumor he was spreading, 
App. 131A, and because no evidence in the record other than 
De Ritis’s own testimony supports the rumor’s truth, 
De Ritis’s statements to Maddren and to McGarrigle were 
“recklessly . . . false,” Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1272.10  But that 
fact means merely that his interest, “as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern” receives less 
weight when balanced against the employer’s interest “in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
                                              
10 We disagree with the District Court’s statement that 
“there is no evidence that [De Ritis’s] speech was knowingly 
or recklessly false,” De Ritis, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 242, a legal 
conclusion over which our review remains plenary, see 
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986.  We hold, as a matter of law, that 
a person’s speech is recklessly false when he disseminates 
“gossip” in the form of “fourth-person hearsay” and chooses 
to do so for “six months or eight months” without 
investigating its truth.  App. 129A, 131A. 
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through its employees” at the third step of the protected 
speech analysis, Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466; see, e.g., 
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274; it does not mean that his 
statements to Maddren and to McGarrigle are per se 
unprotected, for matters of public concern may “overlap” 
with matters that do not receive First Amendment protection, 
such as “personal grievances,” see Fraternal Order of Police, 
842 F.3d at 243.  We thus go on to consider whether 
De Ritis’s statements to Maddren and to McGarrigle 
nonetheless lack protection because they gave Roger adequate 
justification to treat De Ritis differently from a member of the 
general public. 
3. Justification for Treating De Ritis Differently 
from the Public 
At the third step of the protected speech analysis, we 
inquire into whether Roger had “adequate justification” for 
treating De Ritis “differently than the general public based on 
[his] needs as an employer under the Pickering balancing 
test.”  Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466.  Specifically, we balance 
De Ritis’s interests, “as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern” with “the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”  Id. (citing 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  If the Government’s interest is 
“significantly greater” than De Ritis’s interest in contributing 
to public debate, then De Ritis’s speech is not protected.  
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. 
First, we consider De Ritis’s “interest in engaging in [his] 
speech,” Miller, 544 F.3d at 548, and “the interest[] of . . . the 
public in the speech at issue,” Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991.  
Because “a stronger showing of government interests may be 
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necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially 
involves matters of public concern,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 
(brackets omitted), the magnitude of this interest rests on the 
extent to which De Ritis’s speech addressed an issue of public 
concern, see Miller, 544 F.3d at 549-50.  Although “the 
public has a significant interest in encouraging legitimate 
whistleblowing so that it may receive and evaluate 
information concerning the alleged abuses of public 
officials,” Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991 (brackets and ellipsis 
omitted), it has little interest in speech that “brush[es] ever so 
gently against a matter of public concern” but nonetheless 
remains “focused upon [the employee’s] private grievances as 
an employee,” Miller, 544 F.3d at 550-51. 
De Ritis’s speech here is more a private grievance than an 
instance of legitimate whistleblowing, and thus we accord 
De Ritis’s side of the scale lesser weight.  Even as De Ritis 
urged Maddren and McGarrigle to investigate alleged 
misconduct he viewed to “violat[e] the rights of his clients,” 
De Ritis remained focused on how his perceived demotion 
“was hurting his career” and how he wanted Maddren and 
McGarrigle “to intervene in the administration of the Public 
Defender’s Office on his behalf.”   
App. 52A-53A.  Notably, De Ritis did not seek intervention 
to protect the rights of the Public Defender Office’s clients 
generally; he sought intervention only with respect to his own 
employment situation. 
More importantly, De Ritis’s “continued failure to verify 
and substantiate” his allegations points up his “self-interest.”  
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274.  Although De Ritis was not 
necessarily required to discuss his complaints with his 
supervisor, Roger, see Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 
105 (1983), he waited “six months or eight months” before 
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approaching Maddren and McGarrigle about his concerns, 
App. 131A, and he could have taken that step much sooner.  
By his own admission, he did not do so because he “thought it 
was going to work itself out”—in other words, because he 
thought that, if his “punishment” ended and he was returned 
to a trial team, there would be no need to broach the topic 
with Maddren or with McGarrigle.  App. 131A, 133A.  
De Ritis’s “prolonged failure to authenticate [his] 
allegations . . . approaches reckless indifference to their 
veracity,” Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274, which we would hold 
against De Ritis even if his allegations were true, for “[t]he 
issue is not falsity vel non but whether [the] statements . . . 
were knowingly and recklessly made,” Springer v. Henry, 
435 F.3d 268, 278 (3d Cir. 2006).  In sum, De Ritis’s 
statements to Maddren and to McGarrigle showed “self-
interest, not public spirit.”  Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274. 
Second, on the other side of the scale, we consider 
Roger’s “countervailing interests, including [his] prerogative 
of removing employees whose conduct impairs performance,” 
as well as “concerns for the morale of the workplace, 
harmonious relationships among co-workers, and the regular 
operation of the enterprise.”  Miller, 544 F.3d at 548.  Those 
countervailing interests are substantial here.  De Ritis’s 
statements, which accused Roger of managing the Office in a 
way that would appease a judge at the expense of clients’ 
rights, “impugned the integrity of his superiors” and 
colleagues in a weighty manner.  Watters v. City of Phila., 55 
F.3d 886, 898 (3d Cir. 1995) (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  As Roger aptly put it, De Ritis “cut[] to the 
core of [their] integrity as public defenders and fundamentally 
threaten[ed] the idea that [they] are committed to zealously 
defending the people [they] represent.”  App. 39A. 
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What’s more, in a small office of twenty-seven public 
defenders, such statements “would seriously undermine the 
effectiveness of the working relationship” between De Ritis 
and Roger, Watters, 55 F.3d at 897 (quoting Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 570 n.3), the Public Defender whose positions he 
represents before the courts and the public, see 16 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 9960.5(a) (stating that “assistant public defenders” 
enable the public defender “to carry out the duties of his 
office”).  Although not an “alter ego” of the public defender, 
Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1976), an 
assistant public defender is appointed or hired as a 
representative of the public defender, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(g)(2)(A); 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9960.5(a), just as an 
assistant United States attorney represents the United States 
Attorney under whom she serves.  These “close working 
relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are 
necessary,” Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 991, are distinct from 
those inherent in, for example, administrative roles or even a 
position as an associate at a law firm, where job descriptions 
and titles do not rest on the idea that the employee necessarily 
represents the positions of his supervisor, cf. id. at 982-84, 
992.  Here, therefore, “the potential disruptiveness” of 
De Ritis’s speech was considerable.  Watters, 55 F.3d at 
896.11 
                                              
11 Although De Ritis asserts that Roger provided no 
evidence of disruption, Roger had no need to do so, for it is 
clear here “that disruption [was] likely to occur because of 
[De Ritis’s] speech,” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 472, and the 
Pickering balancing test asks us to focus our disruptiveness 
analysis on whether the government employee’s speech was 
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Under the Pickering balancing test, De Ritis’s interest in 
disseminating “fourth-person hearsay,” gleaned from  
after-work “gossip,” App. 129A, pales in comparison to the 
“potential disrupt[ion]” it could have caused to the Public 
Defender’s Office, Watters, 55 F.3d at 896.  Whatever First 
Amendment value De Ritis’s statements had, those statements 
gave Roger adequate justification to treat him differently 
from a member of the public.  For that reason, we conclude at 
this third stage of the analysis that De Ritis’s speech was not 
protected, putting a hard stop to his First Amendment claim 
against Roger and entitling Roger to qualified immunity for 
his decision to fire De Ritis.12  On remand, therefore, 
                                                                                                     
“likely to be disruptive,” Watters, 55 F.3d at 896 (emphasis 
added). 
12 As we conclude that there was no constitutional right 
violated by Roger under then-existing case law, a fortiori, 
such right was not “‘clearly established’ at the time of the 
challenged conduct,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381, and thus 
Roger was entitled to qualified immunity on that independent 
ground.  The District Judge here diligently identified the 
relevant case law and properly recognized as a general matter 
that a public employee has a clearly established right to 
“alleg[e] misconduct or wrongdoing by public officials.”  
De Ritis, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 245; see, e.g., Dougherty, 772 
F.3d at 982-84, 987-94; Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 100-07.  That 
description of the right, however, is so general as to 
encompass not only cases where speech alleging misconduct 
or wrongdoing is protected, see, e.g., Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 
982-84, 987-94, but also those where it is not, see, e.g., 
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1262-64, 1269-74.  Under our case law, 
the “clearly established” inquiry requires reference not to 
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judgment should be entered in Roger’s favor on this claim.  
See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of qualified immunity and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.13 
                                                                                                     
such “broad general proposition[s],” but to precedent that is 
“factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations,” based on “the 
specific context of the case.”  Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child 
Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d. Cir. 2016). 
13 Our disposition reaches only the First Amendment 
claim against Roger, as the pending Pennsylvania 
Whistleblower Act claim is not before us on appeal.  See 
supra note 1.  On remand, the District Court should 
“consider . . . the values of judicial economy, convenience, 
fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise 
jurisdiction over . . . [that] pendent state-law claim[]” or to 
dismiss that claim without prejudice.  Carnegie-Mellon Univ. 
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 & n.7 (1988); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d 
Cir. 2009); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Del. Cty., Pa., 983 F.2d 
1277, 1284-85 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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